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Abstract: Contrary to the expectations of secularization theory, religion remains socially important and affects politics in
multiple ways—especially regarding conflict between religious communities. Theoretically, religion can increase altruism,
but belief in the superiority of one’s faith may facilitate intergroup discrimination and related conflict. Previous findings
remain inconclusive, however, as specific religious ideas have hardly been tested. In this article, we argue that the content
of religious ideas has causal effects on intergroup discrimination. We hence test the impact of two opposing, prominent
religious ideas on altruism and discrimination: universal love and the notion of one true religion. Conducting dictator
games with Christians and Muslims in Ghana and Tanzania, we find causal effects: Whereas the idea of one true religion
increases intergroup discrimination, that of universal love fosters equal treatment. The policy implications hereof are
obvious—promoting tolerant religious ideas seems crucial to avoiding conflict.
Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results,
procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VG3UFZ.
Man is a Religious Animal. He is the only Reli-
gious Animal. He is the only animal that has the
True Religion—several of them. He is the only
animal that loves his neighbor as himself and
cuts his throat if his theology isn’t straight.
—Mark Twain (“The Lowest Animal” 1896)
Secularization theory has assumed religion to bebecoming less and less important, but real-worlddevelopments have not conformed to this ex-
pectation (Fox 2018; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011).
As of 2017, more than 80% of the world’s population
identified with a religious group, and the number of
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Muslims and Christians was expected to increase even
further in the coming decades (Pew Research Center
2017). Religious ideas and identities affect politics in
many ways, including political preferences (McKenzie
and Rouse 2013; Spenkuch and Tillmann 2018), foreign
policy choices, and democratization processes (Fox 2018;
Philpott 2007; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011).
Religion seems to have become more contentious re-
cently. Distrust between Christians and Muslims (Obaidi
et al. 2018) has increased, as has discrimination against
religious minorities (Fox 2016; Grim and Finke 2011).
Violence between religious communities and over reli-
gious ideas has been on the rise: Basedau, Pfeiffer, and
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Vüllers (2016) find in more than 45% of all conflicts
since 1990 that religion came between warring factions
(see also Svensson and Nilsson 2018; Walter 2017). The
most recent data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gramme (UCDP) identified 51 armed conflict dyads in
2017 (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019), at least
69% of which were related to either religious identity
and/or ideas.1
Theoretically, the effect of faith on social relations
is ambivalent (Appleby 2000; Philpott 2007). Religion
provides values and norms, and bonds believers—thus
fostering cohesion and altruism (Barro and McCleary
2003; Johnson 2015). At the same time, religious ideas
and identities can be exclusive, imposing religious norms
and discriminating against nonbelievers (Basedau, Pfeif-
fer, and Vüllers 2016; Obaidi et al. 2018). The key question
is this: Does religion foster altruism only toward mem-
bers of one’s own religious group while also promoting
discriminatory behavior toward members of other ones?
We argue that the specific content of religious ideas
contributes to answering this pertinent question. Focus-
ing on the highly important yet understudied topic of
the “ambivalence of the sacred,” we test the impact of
two opposing, prominent religious ideas on altruism and
intergroup discrimination: universal love and the notion
of one true religion. Both ideas can be considered as core
elements of the Abrahamic faiths, especially the world’s
biggest religions, Christianity and Islam (e.g., Assmann
2009). We chose Ghana and Tanzania as our sites of ex-
perimentation, as they demonstrate religious diversity but
are not hot spots for religious violence—thus constituting
a robust test of our hypotheses.
A large body of research has explored the impact of
religion on prosocial behavior. Prosociality can be broadly
defined as acts that benefit others, such as cooperating and
sharing (Batson and Powell 2003). Many of these stud-
ies, which rely on self-reported measures, find a positive
connection between the two (Batson, Schoenrade, and
Ventis 1993; McCullough and Worthington 1999; Power
2017). However, they often lack causal identification and
cannot rule out reverse causality, spurious correlation, or
omitted variable bias. In addition, religiosity increases so-
cially desirable responses (Gervais and Norenzayan 2012;
Sedikides and Gebauer 2010).
Incentivized experimental studies have overcome
these shortcomings by paying participants according to
their decisions, thus providing them with incentives to
1Out of the 51, we count only six cases that do not have a reli-
gious dimension to them. The remainder have either an ideational
dimension (n = 12; e.g., Algeria, Mali, Somalia), an identity di-
mension (n = 4; e.g., Azerbaijan, Myanmar), or both (n = 19; e.g.,
Iraq, Syria, Nigeria). In six further cases, the role of religion could
not be ascertained.
truthfully reveal their core preferences (Smith 1982). This
makes experiments less prone to response biases com-
pared to survey measures (Hoffmann 2013). Participants
are randomly assigned to different treatments where one
specific factor of interest is varied while the others are held
constant. In this way, causality can be detected. Studies
on religion and prosocial behavior draw primarily on
priming techniques.2 For religion, priming appears to
be a realistic tool—as attending religious services can be
considered a prime that activates one or more specific
religious ideas.
A recent meta-study—including 93 experimental
studies with more than 11,000 participants—reports a
small to medium positive effect of religious primes on
prosocial behavior (Shariff et al. 2016). Yet most of the
studies included did not differentiate between religious
content, instead aiming to make general statements about
the effects of religion on behavior. A notable exception is
the one by Preston and Ritter (2013), who find behavioral
differences between priming the concepts of “God” and
“religion.” This has important implications: Varying as-
pects of religion can lead to different forms of behavior,
and thus they should be closely investigated.
A related strand of literature focuses on the darker
side of religion: the limits to altruism. These studies mea-
sure discrimination, specifically by observing whether
participants’ behavior in experiments varies depending
on the religious identity of their interaction partner. This
literature again offers inconclusive results, however. A
meta-study by Lane (2016) finds that 14.3% of their in-
cluded studies reveal (mostly small levels of) religious
outgroup discrimination (80.9% find none; 4.8% find
outgroup favoritism).
We believe that religious content matters, and it helps
explain the inconclusive results of the literature. When
priming a general concept of religion, it is impossible to
control for the specific religious idea that an individual
associates with this multidimensional concept. In partic-
ular, it is not possible to account for the ambivalence of
the sacred—according to which different religious ideas
may have opposing effects on behavior. To the best of our
knowledge, our study is the first to focus on the impact
of ambiguous religious ideas on prosocial behavior. We
thus unravel the mechanisms determining how religion
influences altruism and intergroup discrimination.
2We focus on experimental studies using such techniques too.
For overviews of the multidimensional effects of religion on so-
cioeconomic development, see Hoffmann (2013) and Basedau,
Gobien, and Prediger (2018). Typical primes that activate religious
identity and ideas include the sentence-unscrambling tasks used by
Shariff and Norenzayan (2007), which contain words such as God
or divine; situating players in a religious surrounding, such as a
temple or church (Ahmed and Salas 2013); or letting participants
listen to a prayer call (Aveyard 2014).
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We conducted artefactual field experiments3 with
nonstudent Christian and Muslim believers in Accra
(Ghana) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). In contrast to
most previous studies, we drew on a large sample size:
1,254 participants. To measure the effect of religious ideas
on altruism,4 we used a dictator game and tested in a
between-subject design a nonreligious control prime ver-
sus two treatments: (1) priming the idea that religion
means loving all human beings and (2) priming the idea
of the existence of only one true religion. To measure
discrimination, we adopted a within-subject design: Each
participant played the dictator game twice—once with a
recipient of the same religion and once with a recipient of
a different one. With this design, we can contrast the two
religious ideas and explore whether they have an effect on
the general level of altruism as well as on the intensity and
occurrence of intergroup discrimination.5
We find that neither religious idea has an effect on
the general level of altruism displayed. However, religious
ideas do matter when it comes to the limits thereof. The
idea of universal love leads to more equal treatment of
both the religious ingroup and outgroup: It increases the
proportion of participants who transfer the same amount
of money to both. In contrast, under the one true reli-
gion prime, the religious outgroup receives 11.82% lower
transfers compared to the ingroup.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows:
In the next section, we discuss related research on reli-
gion and subsequently develop our hypotheses. The sub-
sequent section outlines the country contexts for Ghana
and Tanzania and presents the experimental procedures.
We then discuss our results. We close the article by dis-
cussing our findings and summarizing their implications.
Related Research, Theorizing,
and Hypotheses
Religion and Altruism
Why should religion even be connected to prosocial
behavior in the first place? Via the lens of cultural
3We consider our experiment to be an artefactual field experiment
in accordance with Harrison and List (2004). Our subjects are
nonstudents recruited in natural environments, who are nonethe-
less aware that they are participating in an experiment.
4We measure altruism as one specific form of pro-sociality while
ruling out potential reciprocity impulses that can be prevalent in
other experiments such as the ultimatum game—in which one
player responds conditionally on the behavior of the other.
5We take into account that discrimination has two relevant di-
mensions to it: how many people discriminate and the intensity of
discrimination (e.g., see Piazza 2009). Even if only a small number
of people discriminate (occurrence), the intensity of discrimina-
tion may still be high, or vice versa. This distinction is less relevant
for altruism. Here, the overall size of the transfers is crucial.
evolution, Norenzayan et al. (2016) explain the emer-
gence of religions’ social functions. Ideas, norms, and
practices that increased social cohesion, including the col-
lective practicing of rituals, were historically favored. As-
pects of supernaturalism were eventually combined with
ones of morality and altruism in such a way that su-
pervision and punishment duties were “outsourced” to
supernatural agents (Norenzayan et al. 2016). Punishing
or rewarding gods who cared about human morality de-
termined the behavior of humans on Earth, providing
the latter with incentives to behave prosocially (Johnson
2015; Norenzayan and Shariff 2008; Preston and Ritter
2013). As such, a connection between religion and al-
truism is attributed to the belief in supernatural punish-
ment in case of misbehavior (Galen 2012; Purzycki et al.
2016).
On the other hand, religious practices such as con-
fession, divine forgiveness, and absolution may decrease
prosocial behavior. Weber referred to the “catholic cycle
of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by re-
newed sin” (1904/1905 [2011]). If one’s sins are forgiven,
the reason to behave prosocially may cease to exist—
or one might even have an incentive to sin whenever
it suits one’s own interests. “Theological determinism”
might also work against prosociality: If the world was
created by God, He willingly made it that way. Therefore,
if humans were not created as prosocial beings, this is also
God’s will (Vihvelin 2017).
This ambiguity is also reflected in the experimental
literature. Several studies show that religious primes in-
crease altruism (Ahmed and Salas 2011; McKay et al.
2011; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007; Xygalatas 2013),
cooperation (Ahmed and Salas 2011; Xygalatas 2013),
honesty (Mazar and Ariely 2006; Randolph-Seng and
Nielsen 2007), or the costly punishment of actions per-
ceived as unfair (McKay et al. 2011). Other studies,
however, do not confirm the positive effect of religion
on prosocial behavior. Gomes and McCullough (2015)
fail to replicate the results of Shariff and Norenzayan
(2007)—the pioneering study here—when conducting
dictator games with a larger sample of student and non-
student participants from the United States. Likewise,
a recent large-scale replication of the study by Mazar
and Ariely (2006) did not observe positive effects of
priming religious concepts on honesty (Verschuere et al.
2018). Similarly, Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher (2016) do
not observe any effects of religious primes on proso-
cial behavior in laboratory dictator games, even though
they find a positive effect on contributions within pub-
lic goods games. In their experimental study in Ghana,
Parra, Joseph, and Wodon (2016) observe that prim-
ing religious concepts even reduces transfers in dictator
games.
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These inconclusive results might be explained by the
fact that most studies using priming techniques activate
the concept of religion per se (see Table 1 for more in-
formation on the primes used by different studies); none
used religious primes that are explicitly connected to al-
truism, however. Often, they did not provide any spe-
cific content, but rather primed single words or neutral
sentences. Herewith, it is not possible to control which
particular religious idea exactly becomes salient to the
primed person.
Religious scripts include, for example, rules for dif-
ferent aspects of life—such as prayer requirements or
dietary regulations—not directly connected to prosocial
behavior. Other ideas, such as the Protestant ethic of self-
responsibility for earthly matters, might even decrease
altruism. However, numerous other religious ideas, espe-
cially in the Abrahamic faiths, emphasize love, morality,
and prosociality (e.g., in the Quran, “God loves the doers
of the good deeds,” 3:133; in the Bible, “Whoever does
not love does not know God, for God is love,” 1 John 4:8).
Such ideas of universal love may activate unconditional
prosociality toward a third person. We therefore do not
expect that activating religion per se increases altruism,
but rather:
H1: The religious idea of universal love increases un-
conditional altruism relative to a neutral, nonre-
ligious idea.
Religion and Intergroup Discrimination
A growing body of research looks at the connection
between religion and intergroup discrimination. Social
identity theory argues that people tend to favor their in-
group when group identity is made salient (Tajfel et al.
1971). The existence of a religious identity may already
result in stereotypes and prejudices toward other reli-
gious groups, leading to intergroup discrimination (All-
port 1954). Furthermore, as mobilization theories argue,
leaders can capitalize on social identities such as religious
ones to gain political support, which can, under certain
circumstances, lead to violent conflict (Basedau, Pfeiffer,
and Vüllers 2016; Walter 2017). Here, characteristics such
as the size of the religious group, the structure of its hier-
archy, and individual religious beliefs play a role (Philpott
2007). Although the social cohesion effect of religion may
cause greater ingroup favoritism, on the one hand, it may
also facilitate outgroup discrimination, on the other.6
6While ingroup favoritism does not imply outgroup discrimination
per se, it can be a driver thereof (Allport 1954; Balliet, Wu, and De
Dreu 2014; Brewer 1999).
Empirically, most studies aim at exploring whether
intergroup bias between different identity groups—like
religious ones—exists. Previous studies on religious in-
tergroup bias have come to inconclusive results (see Ta-
ble A1 in the supporting information [SI]). In their ex-
periments, Chuah, Fahoum, and Hoffmann (2013) and
Chuah et al. (2016) find outgroup biases between Mus-
lims and Hindus in India, China, Malaysia, and the
United Kingdom. Similarly, Chakravarty et al. (2016b)
provide some evidence of outgroup bias between Hin-
dus and Muslims in cooperation games in India. At the
same time, the authors do not find consistent evidence
in noncooperative games (Chakravarty et al. 2016a), and
Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, and Martinsson (2009)
similarly find no evidence for intergroup bias among re-
ligious groups in Bangladesh. Gupta et al. (2018) con-
clude that it is not religious identity but rather minority
versus majority status that is responsible for intergroup
bias.
Previous studies have not looked at the ambivalent
content of religious ideas and how they relate to inter-
religious discrimination. Ideas of universal love may ac-
tivate prosociality independently of the other person’s
religious identity and thus prevent discrimination. Yet,
monotheistic and missionary religions’ claim to univer-
sal validity comes at a price (Assmann 2009). These re-
ligions usually distinguish between a religious ingroup,
which believes in the one true religion, and an out-
group, which follows the false faith. Such missionary
monotheism is a central feature of the world’s biggest
faiths, Christianity and Islam. Examples can be found in
the Quran—“O you who believe! Fight those of the un-
believers who are near to you and let them find in you
hardness” (9:123)—or in the Bible: “If your very own
brother, or your son or daughter, or the wife you love,
or your closest friend secretly entices you, saying, ‘Let us
go and worship other gods’ [ . . . ], do not yield to them
or listen to them. Show them no pity. Do not spare them
or shield them. You must certainly put them to death”
(Deuteronomy 13).
Such notions of only one true religion call for neg-
ative behavior toward other religious groups—in sharp
contrast to the idea of universal love. For this reason, we
expect the following:
H2a: The idea of universal love reduces outgroup dis-
crimination relative to a neutral, nonreligious
idea.
H2b: The idea of one true religion increases outgroup
discrimination relative to a neutral, nonreligious
idea.
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TABLE 1 Overview of Experimental Priming Studies on Prosociality
Author(s)/Year/
Sample Size
Treatments and
Religious Prime Prime Description
Operationalization
of Prosociality Results
Preston and Ritter
(2013)—Study 3,
n = 85
T1: religion (prime:
religion), T2: God (prime:
God), T3: control (prime:
broccoli/hat)
Participants see the
religious/control
primes on a
computer screen
Prisoner’s Dilemma
(cooperation)
No general effect on
cooperation; God prime
increases cooperation with
outgroup; religion prime
increases cooperation with
ingroup
Parra, Joseph, and
Wodon (2016),
n = 393
T1: religion (photos of
Christian/ Muslim believers
praying and other religious
symbols), T2: control
(photos of fruits)
Participants see
photos of the
religious/control
primes.
Dictator Game
(altruism)
Religious primes reduce
general prosociality.
Priming for religion reduces
the allocations to
participants with a different
religious affiliation
Shariff and
Norenzayan
(2007), n = 50 in
Study 1, n = 78 in
Study 2
S1–T1: religion (prime:
spirit, divine, God, sacred,
prophet), T2: no prime
Participants
unscramble
sentences involving
religious words
Dictator Game
(altruism)
Religious primes increase
general prosociality
S2–T1: religion (same prime
as S1), T2: secular (prime:
civic, jury, court, police,
contract),
T3: control (the words are
not reported)
Ahmed and Salas
(2011), n = 224
T1: religion (prime:
spiritual, divine,
benediction, holy,
Jerusalem, God, Jesus,
prophet), T2: control
(prime e.g.: palm, sofa,
beach, food)
Participants
unscramble
sentences involving
religious words
Dictator Game +
Prisoner’s Dilemma
(altruism and
cooperation)
Religious primes increase
general prosociality
Gomes and
McCullough
(2015), n = 650
T1: standard religious prime
(same prime as S&N in a
sentence with religious
context), T2: enhanced
religious prime (same prime
as S&N in a sentence with
nonreligious context),
T3: control (prime e.g.: fall,
shoes, train, sky)
Participants
unscramble
sentences involving
religious words
Dictator Game
(altruism)
No effect on general
prosociality
Benjamin et al.
(2016), n = 817
T1: religion (same prime as
S&N), T2: control (same
prime as S&N)
Participants
unscramble
sentences involving
religious words
Public Goods Game
+ Dictator Game
(cooperation and
altruism)
No effect on general
prosociality in DG, more
contributions in PGG (not
for Catholics)
Xygalatas (2013),
n = 62
T1: experimental venue is a
temple, T2: experimental
venue is a restaurant
Participants either
play in a temple or
in a restaurant
Bargaining game Participants in the temple
are more prosocial
McKay et al.
(2011), n = 304
T1: religion (primes: divine,
holy, pious, religious), T2:
punishment (primes:
revenge, punish, penalty,
retribution), T3:
religion–punishment
(primes: divine, revenge,
pious, punish), T4: control
(primes: northeast, acoustic,
tractor, carton)
Words appear on a
computer screen
Punishment of
unfair behavior
Religious primes increase
the costly punishment of
unfair behaviors for those
participants who had
previously donated to a
religious organization
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 Continued
Author(s)/Year/
Sample Size
Treatments and
Religious Prime Prime Description
Operationalization of
Prosociality Results
Randolph-Seng
and Nielsen (2007),
n = 52 in Study 1,
n = 54 in Study 2
S1–T1: religion (primes:
heaven, bless, gospel, cross,
faith, prayer, salvation, saved,
holy, worship), T2: sports
(primes not reported), T3:
neutral (primes not
reported)
Participants
unscramble sentences
involving religious
words
Cheating Religiously primed group
cheats less
S2–T1: religion (primes:
same as in S1 and,
additionally, baptism, amen,
church, resurrection,
commandments,
communion, saint, prophet,
sabbath, preacher), T2:
neutral (primes not
reported)
Mazar and Ariely
(2006), n = 229 in
Study 1
T1: moral reminder (writing
down 10 Commandments)
Participants write
down what they
remember of the 10
Commandments
Cheating Religious prime
significantly reduces
cheatingT2: no moral reminder
(writing down names of
books)
Verschuere et al.
(2018), n = 5,786
Same as Mazar and Ariely
(2006), S1
Participants write
down what they
remember of the 10
Commandments
Cheating No effect of religious
prime
Research Context and Experimental
Design
Context
We conducted artefactual field experiments in two coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana and Tanzania. In
Ghana, the majority of the population is either Christian
(75%) or Muslim (16%; Afrobarometer 2018a). The ma-
jority of Muslims live in the northern part of the country,
whereas Christianity has spread through the coastal areas
in the center and south. Tanzania does not collect census
data on the distribution of faiths. However, sources sug-
gest that approximately 61% of believers are Christian and
approximately 30% are Muslim (Afrobarometer 2018b).
Although Islam originally spread from the coastal regions
to the inland of the country, a clear geographical separa-
tion of predominantly Muslim or Christian regions is not
possible; Julius Nyerere’s “Ujamaa” policy of relocating
citizens led to a blending of religions and ethnicities there
in the 1980s.
We conducted experiments in the largest city of each
country: Accra in Ghana and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.
In Accra, Christians form the majority, and Muslims con-
stitute the largest minority. In Dar es Salaam, division is
more equal. Both cities can be considered melting pots
for the whole country, attracting migrants from rural ar-
eas. Whereas Dar es Salaam’s religious composition has
traditionally been characterized by a comparably large
number of Muslim believers, in Accra, Muslim believers
have mostly migrated to the city. In both countries, re-
ligious practice plays a major role in the lives of most:
According to surveys, 77% of the population in Ghana
and Tanzania attend a religious service at least once a
week (Afrobarometer 2014).
Both country cases represent examples of the rather
peaceful coexistence of a Christian majority and a Mus-
lim minority. In Ghana, there have been no major con-
flicts between Christian and Muslim believers, and in-
teractions between the two religious groups work well
(Religious Freedom Report 2016). Tanzania’s everyday
interactions between the religions also seem generally
peaceful and tolerant, though there have been recurring
conflicts (Heilman and Kaiser 2002). Recently, attacks on
churches and mosques have been slightly on the increase
(Religious Freedom Report 2016). Findings on religious
discrimination in these relatively peaceful nations can be
interpreted as a robust test of our hypotheses compared
to more troublesome countries, where discrimination is
more likely to occur. In addition, relying on data from two
separate countries increases the generalizability of our
results.
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Experimental Design
We used a dictator game to measure altruism. This is a
two-player game in which one person is assigned the role
of the “dictator” and endowed with a monetary budget.
The dictator decides how to allocate the budget between
himself or herself and the second player (“receiver”). Un-
der the standard assumption of the “homo oeconomicus
model,” rationally acting dictators would keep the entire
amount for themselves, as this maximizes their personal
gain. Positive transfers to the receiver are commonly in-
terpreted as demonstrative of altruistic behavior.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of
three treatments: (1) universal love, (2) one true religion,
or (3) the control group. Participants played the role of
dictator twice. For one of the two decisions, the receiver7
belonged to the same religious group as the dictator; for
the other, he or she belonged to a different one. The order
used for revealing the religious identity of the receiver
was randomized, meaning that some participants first
decided how much to give to a receiver from the same
religious group, whereas others first decided how much
to give to one from a different group (see Figure 1). This
randomization allowed us to separate out order effects
(i.e., participants’ giving more in the first round than in
the second) from differences in giving behavior depend-
ing on the receiver’s religious group. Decisions were taken
directly after the priming, and in private.
Two features of our experimental design were crucial:
(1) how we primed the religious ideas and (2) how we
revealed the religious identity of the interaction partner.
As noted earlier, we used priming techniques to make
the two specific religious ideas salient. The scrambled-
sentence task proposed by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007;
cf. Ahmed and Salas 2011; Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher
2016; Laurin, Kay, and Fitzsimons 2012) proved in our
context not to be feasible, as many of our participants
were illiterate. Instead, we chose to prime religious ideas
by verbally reading out three statements with which the
participants could agree, disagree, or neither agree nor
disagree before making decisions. Verbally reading out
statements has the additional advantage that it is similar to
attending religious services, where content is also verbally
transmitted. The two initial statements conveyed content
neutral to religion and prosocial behavior,8 and they were
the same across the control and treatment groups. In
7Transfers were randomly assigned to participants of a survey con-
ducted in both countries independently of the experiments.
8Independently of their treatment, all participants were asked:
“Some people claim that the world is better off because of new
technologies. Do you agree, disagree, or are you undecided?” and
“Some people claim that it is important to think up new ideas and
contrast, the third statement transmitted the religious
idea and varied between treatments:
Universal love treatment: Some people claim that true re-
ligion means loving all human beings. Do you agree,
disagree, or are you undecided?
One true religion treatment: Some people claim that their
religion is the only true religion and wish that every-
one followed their faith. Do you agree, disagree, or
are you undecided?
Control treatment: Some people claim that everyone is tal-
ented at something, but no one is talented at every-
thing. Do you agree, disagree, or are you undecided?
Our priming approach was relatively subtle. We consider
this a strength. If we observed results when using this
subtle prime, they would potentially be stronger when
priming in a more explicit way and when priming in
more conflict-prone contexts.
The second relevant design feature was the ques-
tion of how to reveal the religious identity of the in-
teraction partner. Most studies reveal the interaction
partner’s (ethnic or religious) identity by using typical
names (Chakravarty et al. 2016b; Chuah, Fahoum, and
Hoffmann 2013; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001) or by us-
ing names and visual cues simultaneously (Chakravarty
et al. 2016b). Prior to our research study, we therefore
conducted a survey at a large market in Accra to find
out more about the connection between religion and
names. This survey revealed that Muslim first names
are often associated with that religious group, but that
Christian ones are often unrelated to their own respective
group. Instead, they are associated with categories such as
“Western name” or “friend.” Therefore, we refrained from
using this approach.
Other studies explicitly inform participants about the
interaction partner’s religion by directly stating his or her
religious affiliation (Chuah et al. 2014; Gupta et al. 2018).
Providing such information about the recipient’s religious
group in a within-subject design has the disadvantage that
participants can infer what the study is about and may
therefore seek to demonstrate socially desirable behavior.
We ultimately chose to give visual information about the
interaction partner’s religious group by showing photos
of large crowds of people praying in a church or in a
mosque directly before the participants were to make the
first decision, and then again directly before they made
the second. The photos were taken from behind, in such
a way that faces could not be recognized (see examples in
SI Appendix C). While viewing the photos, participants
be creative, to do things one’s own way. Do you agree, disagree, or
are you undecided?”
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FIGURE 1 Structure of the Dictator Game
were told: “The person you can give money to lives in
[Accra/Dar es Salaam] and is someone like those in this
picture.” This was meant to imply the religious affiliation
of the interaction player (“someone like” was meant to re-
fer to the religious group) without explicitly stating that
the photo was connected to religion in any way. Possi-
ble associations other than the religious affiliation of the
interaction player are “religious person” and “religious
service.” This prime is, again, relatively subtle, and we
would expect to find stronger effects with more explicit
identity revelations.
Experimental Procedures
We ran artefactual field experiments with a total of 623
participants in Accra and 631 in Dar es Salaam, respec-
tively. Fieldwork in Accra was conducted between March
5 and March 20, 2017, whereas that in Dar es Salaam was
conducted between July 2 and July 22, 2017. During this
period, there was no readily identifiable conflict between
Christian and Muslim believers in either of the countries.
The session sizes varied from 20 to 49 participants. In
both cities, Muslim participants were recruited in front
of mosques after Friday prayer, whereas Christian par-
ticipants were recruited outside of churches on Sundays
after service. They were then invited to the experimen-
tal sessions for a different calendar day, to avoid possible
contagion effects due to their previous attendance at the
religious service. Sessions took 2.5 hours,9 on average,
9The whole experimental session consisted of a dictator game, a
prisoner’s dilemma, and a postexperimental questionnaire in that
order. As the prisoner’s dilemma was played as a one-shot game
without varying interaction partners, we did not measure discrim-
ination in this particular experiment.
and were held in neutral (nonreligious) schools, commu-
nity centers, or open spaces. Sessions consisted usually of
either Christian or Muslim participants. However, partic-
ipants were informed that their interaction player was not
present in the respective session. Note that participants
could be affected by the presence of fellow ingroup mem-
bers in such a way that they show more favoritism thereto.
However, as our participants were randomly assigned to
the various treatments, this effect would be constant and
not affect the respective treatments differently.
In Accra, participants (in the role of dictator) could
decide to give up to GHS 10 (USD 7.19 in purchasing
power parity [PPP], terms). In Dar es Salaam, participants
could decide to give up to TZS 5,000 to the recipient (USD
7.24 in PPP terms). Thus, participants in both countries
had 11 choices (in Accra, in increments of GHS 1; in Dar
es Salaam, of TZS 500). Figure 1 shows the number of
participants per treatment.
We implemented the whole experiment as a pen-
and-paper one in the local language (Akan/Ga/Hausa in
Ghana; Swahili in Tanzania) in order to account for the
aforementioned illiteracy issue. All participants afterward
filled in a postexperimental questionnaire. Those partic-
ipants who could not read and write received help from
our local teams. At the end of the experimental proce-
dures, one of the two decisions made in the dictator game
was randomly drawn, and participants received their re-
spective experimental earnings, plus a showing-up fee.10
On average, participants in Ghana earned GHS 38 (USD
27.33 in PPP terms) while in Tanzania the average earn-
ings were TZS 14,000 (USD 20.28 in PPP terms).
10Participants were informed that one of their decisions from the
dictator game would be randomly drawn beforehand (see instruc-
tions in SI Appendix B).
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Results
Sample Description
Our sample consists of 1,254 experimental participants.11
On average, 50% were female; the mean age was 38.5 years.
Of the experimental participants, 49% were Muslims. Re-
ligion plays a major role in the life of the people involved;
approximately 38% of the participants identified primar-
ily with their religious group.12 The vast majority of par-
ticipants across all treatments believe in God/Allah, go
to church/the mosque once a week, and pray regularly.
They believe in heaven, and that God/Allah punishes bad
deeds and rewards good ones. Standard variations for
these variables were low, with at least 80% of participants
choosing the highest category and nearly all observations
being in the two highest categories.
An exception was service attendance, where the two
highest categories combined make up only approximately
70% of the observations. Although it is common in both
countries to have friends from other religions, partici-
pants are unsure about whether interreligious marriage
is acceptable. Overall, our randomization into different
treatments worked well (see Table 2). However, partici-
pants in the one true religion treatment considered in-
terreligious marriage as less acceptable, and those in the
universal love treatment thought religious laws were more
important than state ones, as compared to the other treat-
ments. We control for all sociodemographic factors in the
regression analysis.
SI Figure A2 provides a closer look at the three primes
we used in the dictator game. Approximately 90% of the
participants agreed with the religious idea of universal
love, and with the control prime. The one true religion
prime reveals a more diverse picture: Some 57% of partic-
ipants agreed that there is only one true religion, whereas
42% disagreed.13
Religion and Altruism
Across all treatments, participants transferred, on aver-
age, 23% of their endowment in Accra and 24% in Dar
11Complete sociodemographic information was available for 1,098
participants (the differences across countries can be found in SI
Table A2). For robustness, we control for sociodemographic vari-
ables in our regression analysis. The complete postexperimental
questionnaire can be found in SI Appendix D.
12Other identity groups included in this question are per national-
ity, ethnicity, occupation, and gender.
13There are no major differences between Accra and Dar es Salaam.
Histograms for the two statements prior to the primes and across
locations are displayed in SI Figure A3.
es Salaam. We did not observe significant differences in
the general level of altruism between the treatments (see
Figure 2) or between the two locations.14 Thus, being re-
minded of the ideas of universal love or one true religion
does not promote more altruism as compared to exposure
to a neutral, nonreligious prime (Hypothesis 1).
We use random effects generalized least squares
(GLS) regressions for the proportion of endowment sent,
as presented in Table 3. Regression 1 shows a basic form
thereof for the treatments, including two dummy vari-
ables indicating the one true religion and the universal
love primes. Regression 2 adds sociodemographic and re-
ligious control variables, as well as interviewer dummies.
We control for order effects in all regressions. Treatment
dummies turned out to be insignificant in both regres-
sions. The small coefficients show that there is virtually no
difference across treatment conditions. Adding sociode-
mographic and interviewer controls (Regression 2) does
not change the results.
SI Table A6 presents different model specifications
that test for interaction effects regarding Ghana and Tan-
zania (Regression 1), Muslims and Christians (Regression
2), religion as identity group (Regression 3), and ser-
vice attendance (Regression 4). All interaction terms turn
out to be insignificant. Affirmation of the religious idea
conveyed in the treatments also has no significant effect
in either (Regression 5). We therefore do not find that
religious primes increase the general level of altruism. As
such, we cannot support Hypothesis 1, which expects a
positive effect of the universal love prime on altruism
compared to the control prime.
Result 1: Contrary to Hypothesis 1, we do not find ev-
idence that the idea of universal love increases
unconditional altruism relative to a neutral, non-
religious idea.
Intensity of Intergroup Discrimination
Next, we look at intergroup discrimination. Consider-
ing all treatments and participants, the mean proportion
of endowments sent to recipients with the same religion
is significantly higher than that transferred to recipients
14The results hold true if we restrict the sample to the first round.
We do not find any difference between Christians and Muslims.
We observe a small effect vis-à-vis round in both locations, with
participants sending a higher proportion of their endowment in
the first than in the second (Wilcoxon matched-pairs, signed-ranks
tests to compare within-participant differences: Accra: 0.24 vs. 0.22,
p = .00; Dar es Salaam: 0.24 vs. 0.23, p = .02). An overview of the
distribution of transfers and the average proportion of endowments
sent per treatment, round, and location is presented in SI Figure
A1 and SI Table A3.
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TABLE 2 Sample Description and Randomization
(1)
One True
Religion
(2)
Universal
Love
(3)
Control
Test for
Differencesx
Test for
Differencesx
Test for
Differencesx
Variables Mean/SE Mean/SE Mean/SE (1)–(2) (1)–(3) (2)–(3)
Femalea 0.48 0.52 0.49 –0.04 –0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 39.20 38.88 37.50 0.32 1.69 1.38
(0.87) (0.83) (0.84)
Educationb 3.00 2.83 2.95 0.17 0.06 –0.12
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Perceived living conditionc 2.89 2.80 2.90 0.09 –0.01 –0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Muslim faitha 0.47 0.51 0.49 –0.03 –0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Belonging first and foremost
to religious groupa
0.38 0.40 0.37 –0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Belief in God/Allahd 4.91 4.92 4.94 –0.00 –0.03 –0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Attendance of religious
servicee
3.83 3.90 3.87 –0.07 –0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Practice of prayerf 4.90 4.89 4.89 0.01 0.01 0.00+
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Belief in heavena 0.95 0.97 0.96 –0.02 –0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Belief in hella 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
God/Allah punishes
bad deedsg
4.80 4.80 4.77 –0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
God/Allah rewards
good deedsg
4.82 4.81 4.75 0.01 0.07 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Religious laws more
important than state lawsg
3.84 4.05 3.86 –0.21∗ –0.02 0.19∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
No marriage between
different religionsg
2.93 3.15 3.08 –0.21∗ –0.14 0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Friends from other
religionsa
0.90 0.88 0.89 0.02 0.02 –0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 369 366 357
Notes: (a) Dummy variable: 1 = yes, 0 = no; (b) 7 = postgraduate, 6 = completed postsecondary, 5 = some postsecondary, 4 = secondary
completed, 3 = some secondary, 2 = primary completed, 1 = some primary, 0 = no schooling; (c) In general, how do you rate your living
conditions compared to those of other people in your country? 1 = much worse, 2 = worse, 3 = same, 4 = better, 5 = much better; (d)
5 = I am sure that God/Allah really exists, 4 = Although I sometimes question his existence, I do believe in God/Allah, 3 = I don’t know if
there is a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind, 2 = I don’t know if there is a personal God or a higher power of
some kind, 1 = I don’t believe in a personal God or in a higher power; (e) 5 = a few times a week, 4 = once a week, 3 = once a month,
2 = few times a year, 1 = never; (f) 5 = prayer is a regular part of my daily life, 4 = I usually pray in times of stress or need but rarely at
any other time, 3 = I pray only during formal ceremonies, 2 = prayer has little importance in my life, 1 = I never pray; (g) 5 = strongly
agree, 4 = agree, 3 = uncertain/neither agree nor disagree, 2 = disagree, 1 = strongly disagree. (x) We use a test of proportions for dummy
variables and a Mann-Whitney test for all other variables. The value displayed for the tests are the differences in the means across the
groups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, and + indicate significance at the 0.1, 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
UNIVERSAL LOVE OR ONE TRUE RELIGION? 613
FIGURE 2 Average Fraction of Endowment Sent
over Both Rounds
with a different faith (0.24 vs. 0.23, p = .02).15 The lower
transfers to recipients with a different religion are driven
by the one true religion treatment. Here, the difference
increases in magnitude and becomes statistically signifi-
cant at the 0.1% level (0.22 vs. 0.25, p = .002). We find the
same tendency when we divide our sample according to
the two locations.16 In the universal love and the control
treatments, the difference between transfers to recipients
with the same religion as opposed to a different one is
insignificant and close to 0.17
The regressions in Table 3 include a dummy variable
that becomes 1 if the sender and the recipient in the dic-
tator game have the same religion, and 0 otherwise. We
use this dummy to test whether participants discriminate
with respect to the recipient’s religion. The dummy is pos-
itive and significant in Regressions 1 and 2. A coefficient
of 0.01 means that the proportion of the endowment sent
to a recipient with the same religion increases by 4.3%
on average compared to the average proportion of 0.23
sent to one with a different religion. Table 3 also presents
heterogeneous treatment effects depending on whether
the interaction player comes from the same or a different
religion (Regressions 3 and 4). Regression 3 shows pure
15See SI Table A4. We do not observe a significant difference in
discrimination between Muslims and Christians.
16Accra: same religion = 0.26, other religion = 0.23, p = .001; Dar
es Salaam: same religion = 0.24, other religion = 0.22, p = .24.
17Our results are unlikely to be determined by ethnicity. Participants
in the control group who did not receive a religious prime did not
discriminate (see SI Table A4 and SI Table A5). If ethnicity was the
driver of differences in giving behavior, we would also find such
differences in the control group. For an extensive discussion about
ethnicity and religion as drivers of conflict, see McCauley (2017).
treatment effects, whereas Regression 4 adds additional
control variables.
The interaction term between the one true religion
dummy and the same religion dummy turns out to be
positive and significant in Regressions 3 and 4.
Therefore, the difference in the proportions sent—
that is, the intensity of discrimination—increases under
the one true religion treatment, thereby supporting Hy-
pothesis 2b. The coefficient of 0.03 in Regression 3 means
that the difference in the proportion of the endowment
sent increases on average by 12.5% compared to the aver-
age proportion of 0.24 sent in the control treatment. The
dummy for the universal love prime is insignificant. Re-
gressions 5 and 6 represent Tobit models with censoring
at 0 and 1 (as participants cannot give less than 0 or more
than 1 in Round 2). The results remain robust, and the
interaction term between the one true religion dummy
and the same religion dummy increases in size.
In SI Table A8, we explore the impacts of agreeing
with the primes. The interaction term between the one
true religion treatment (i.e., having an interaction player
of the same religion) and agreement with the one true re-
ligion prime becomes (marginally) significant. Thus, the
one true religion prime especially affected the behavior
of participants who agreed with its content.
Result 3: Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the one true religion
prime increases the intensity of intergroup dis-
crimination as compared to a neutral, nonreli-
gious idea.
Result 4: Opposing Hypothesis 2b, the universal love
prime does not significantly affect the intensity
of intergroup discrimination as compared to a
neutral, nonreligious idea.
Occurrence of Intergroup Discrimination
We next turn to the occurrence of discrimination. Table 4
shows the percentage of participants who sent a lower
transfer (negative discrimination) or a higher transfer
(positive discrimination) to recipients with a different
religion compared to those from the same religion, as
well as participants who did not discriminate with re-
gard to the recipient’s religion (no discrimination). First,
we see that the majority of participants across all three
treatments did not discriminate on the basis of the re-
ligious identity of the receiver. Second, and somewhat
surprisingly, we find a sizable share of individuals who
positively discriminated—that is, they sent more to a per-
son of a different faith than to a recipient of the same one.
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TABLE 3 Proportion of Endowment Sent (1)–(4) Random Effects GLS Regressions, (5)–(6) Tobit
Regressions with Censoring at Zero and One
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One true religion –0.01 0.00 –0.02 –0.01 –0.03 –0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Universal love –0.01 0.00 –0.01 0.01 –0.03 –0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Same religion 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
One true religion ∗ Same religion 0.03∗ 0.02+ 0.03∗ 0.03+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Universal love ∗ Same religion –0.00 –0.01 –0.00 –0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dummy round 2 –0.02∗∗∗ –0.02∗∗∗ –0.02∗∗∗ –0.02∗∗∗ –0.02∗∗∗ –0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.29∗∗∗ 0.24+ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.24+ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.18
(0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.17)
Session controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interviewer controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sociodemographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,508 2,196 2,508 2,196 2,508 2,196
N 1,254 1,098 1,254 1,098 1,254 1,098
Notes: We control for order effects and include a dummy for Dar es Salaam in all regressions. We also control for session effects in all
regressions as multi-levelling models showed between-session variation. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. Regressions
(2), (4) and (6) further include interviewer, sociodemographic and religious controls. The results are presented in Table A7 in the
appendix. Regressions (5) and (6) are Tobit models with double censoring at zero and one. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, and
+ indicate significance at the 0.1, 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Table A9 and Table A10 show regressions for round one and round two
separately.
TABLE 4 Occurrence of Discrimination: Descriptives
(1) (2) (3)
One True Religion Universal Love Control Test for Differences Test for Differences
Variable Mean/SE Mean/SE Mean/SE (1)–(3) (2)–(3)
Positive discrimination 0.15 0.15 0.19 –0.05+ –0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
No discrimination 0.62 0.68 0.59 0.03 0.09∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Negative discrimination 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.02 –0.05+
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
N 425 422 407
Note: We use a test of proportions for dummy variables. The value displayed for the tests are the differences in the means across the groups.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, and + indicate significance at the 0.1, 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
Across all treatments, 16% of the participants engaged in
such positive discrimination.18
18Positive discrimination occurred partly due to a round-specific
effect, driven mainly by participants who did not care about the
religious identity of their interaction partner but who were paired
with someone of a different religion in Round 1 (the round in which
they gave higher proportions). If we exclude these participants from
Third, we observe differences in the occurrence
of discrimination across treatments. We observe a
marginally lower occurrence of negative discrimination
and a significantly higher occurrence of no discrimina-
tion in the universal love treatment, as compared to the
the analysis, we observe 10.7% positive discrimination, 65% no
discrimination, and 24% negative discrimination.
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TABLE 5 Occurrence of Discrimination (Multinomial Logistic Regression for Positive, No, or
Negative Discrimination, Marginal Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables Positive No Negative Positive No Negative Positive No Negative
One true religion –0.04+ 0.03 0.01 –0.04 0.02 0.01 –0.03 0.03 –0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Universal love –0.04 0.09∗∗∗ –0.05+ –0.03 0.10∗∗∗ –0.07∗∗∗ –0.02 0.10∗ –0.08∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Tanzania 0.08 –0.11 0.03 0.11 –0.26∗ 0.16 0.17 –0.26+ 0.09
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13)
Same religion in
round 1
–0.11∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗∗∗ –0.13∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.06∗∗∗ –0.21∗∗∗ 0.04 0.17∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Session controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interviewer controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic
controls
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,108 1,108 1,108 832 832 832
Notes: We include a dummy for Dar es Salaam and a dummy that becomes one if the recipient in the first round belongs to the religious
in-group in all regressions. Regressions (4)–(9) include sociodemographic and religious control variables, as well as interviewer and session
dummies. The results are presented in Table A11 in the appendix. All regressions use standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, and + indicate significance at the 0.1, 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
control treatment. As we cannot control for order effects
when only considering descriptives (i.e., being matched
with an interaction player from a different religious
group in Round 1, and at the same time giving more in
Round 1 than in Round 2), we most likely overestimate
positive discrimination in Table 4. We control for these
order effects in the regression analysis.
Using a multinomial logit regression, we take a closer
look at the question of whether the occurrence of discrim-
ination is influenced by the respective religious treatments
(see Table 5). Our dependent variable includes positive,
no, or negative discrimination. Regressions 1–3 in Table 5
show pure treatment effects, whereas Regressions 4–9 add
additional control variables.
While we find only marginally significant effects
of the one true religion prime on positive discrimina-
tion, the universal love prime significantly increases equal
treatment and tends to counteract both forms of discrim-
ination. This effect is particularly strong for the occur-
rence of negative discrimination (Regressions 3 and 6),
which significantly declines relative to the control group.
Regressions 7, 8, and 9 exclude all participants who gave
0 or 100% of their endowments in Round 1 and therefore
cannot discriminate by giving less than 0% or more than
100% in Round 2. These specifications considerably re-
strict our sample. Our results are robust: For the universal
love treatment, the coefficients confirm the positive sig-
nificant effect on no discrimination and the significant
negative effect on negative discrimination.
Result 5: Somewhat supporting Hypothesis 2a, the one
true religion prime marginally reduces the oc-
currence of positive discrimination as compared
to a neutral, nonreligious idea but does not affect
negative or no discrimination.
Result 6: Supporting Hypothesis 2b, the universal love
prime increases the occurrence of no discrim-
ination and decreases negative discrimination as
compared to a neutral, nonreligious idea. It does
not affect positive discrimination.
In terms of intergroup discrimination, the occurrence (see
Table 5) and the intensity (see Table 3) of discrimination
are both important. The occurrence of discrimination
refers to the general attitudes of a given society in estab-
lishing differences between religious groups. Ideas such as
universal love can reduce the number of people who par-
take in discrimination. Here, the idea of one true religion
does not significantly affect intergroup discrimination—
at least not in peaceful countries like Ghana and Tanzania.
However, among the (smaller) number of discriminators
(i.e., people who possibly are already prejudiced against
other groups) emphasizing the idea of one true religion
leads to more intense discrimination. Thus, the idea of
universal love can reduce the number of discriminators,
whereas that of the one true religion may lead to more
intense intergroup discrimination among those already
prone to discriminating.
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FIGURE 3 Proportion of Endowment Sent in Accra and Dar es Salaam
Differences between Ghana and Tanzania
We also explore the differences between Ghana and Tan-
zania, as country context may matter. Figure 3 shows a
bar graph for the mean proportion of the endowments
sent under all treatments. In particular, the differences
between the one true religion treatment and the control
treatment are interesting here.
In Accra, recipients from the other religion received,
on average, the same amount as the control group did
(control = 0.23, true religion = 0.23, p = .99). Recipi-
ents from the same religion received a higher proportion
of the endowment as compared to the control treatment
(not statistically significant: control = 0.23, true religion
= 0.26, p = .19). In Dar es Salaam, recipients from the
other religion received a significantly smaller proportion
of the endowment as compared to the control group (con-
trol = 0.25, true religion = 0.22, p = 0.07), whereas one
from the same religion received similar proportions (con-
trol = 0.25, true religion = 0.24, p = .25). This hints
at a somewhat different discrimination structure in the
two locations. Participants receiving the one true religion
prime in Accra appear to have given higher proportions
to ingroup members, whereas those in Dar es Salaam ap-
pear to have transferred lower proportions to members
of other religious groups as compared to members of the
control group.
We suggest the following explanation for this: In Tan-
zania, tensions between Muslims and Christians have
been increasing in recent decades (e.g., Rukyaa 2010).
Based on reporting by the U.S. State Department, there
have been a number of violent incidents there since 1990;
in Ghana, meanwhile, there have been almost none. This
tension at the macro level may be transferred into nega-
tive discriminatory behavior at the micro level in Tanza-
nia when religious ideas are activated. The participants’
answers in the postexperimental questionnaire somewhat
support this claim (see SI Table A2). Participants in Dar es
Salaam considered marriage across religions less accept-
able than those in Accra did. These tentative explanations
should be tested in further studies, for example, in more
conflict-prone countries.
The differing views in both countries on intermar-
riage underscore the political relevance of our findings.
We find that people who agree with the idea of one true
religion are not only more discriminating (see SI Table
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A8) but also hold other hostile and fundamentalist views
such as the superiority of religious over state laws.19 Such
perspectives are considered part of an extremist mind-set
that also fosters violence (e.g., Koopmans 2015; Obaidi
et al. 2018).
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that the specific con-
tent of religious ideas affects altruism and intergroup
discrimination—a pertinent topic given the continued
political relevance and increasingly contentious nature
of religion today. To date, the literature on the social ef-
fects of religion has delivered only inconclusive results.
One reason for this ambiguity is that previous work has
primed a general concept of religion, rendering it impos-
sible to control for the individual interpretation of re-
ligion activated by that prime. Different religious ideas
might, however, have varying effects on altruism and
discrimination. To help address this crucial research gap,
we conducted dictator games with Christians and Mus-
lims in Ghana and Tanzania to test the effect of two contra-
dictory and prominent religious ideas: namely, universal
love and the notion of there being only one true religion.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to
account for the “ambivalence of the sacred” and to begin
to unravel the mechanisms behind how religious ideas
influence altruism and interreligious relations.
Our results partly confirm the respective hypotheses
that we put forward: We find that neither religious idea
affects the level of unconditional altruism, but that both
show distinct effects on interreligious discrimination. We
also reveal that the idea of one true religion leads to more
intense outgroup discrimination. At the same time, we
do not find any effect of the idea of universal love on
the intensity of discrimination. However, this idea does
lead to a higher share of participants opting for equal
treatment of the religious in- and outgroups.
Even though our effect sizes are not high, they
are nevertheless important. First, we would expect the
primes’ effects to be larger when conveyed by real-world
religious or political leaders. Second, even though giv-
ing 2% of the endowment can be considered small, it
is almost 11% of the average endowment shared—and
thus actually quite large when put into perspective. The
average effect size for religious discrimination in other
studies is usually rather small; in his meta-study, Lane
19Participants who agree with the one true religion prime are more
likely to esteem religious laws over state laws (two-sided t-test =
0.01) and seem to be more conservative regarding interreligious
marriage too (two-sided t-test = 0.15).
(2016) identifies an average effect of 0.034. Third, Ghana
and Tanzania are examples of the relatively peaceful coex-
istence between followers of different religions. It is likely
that our primes would lead to stronger results in more
conflict-prone contexts.
In our setting, we cannot rule out social desirability
bias: the tendency of certain people to act in a way that
portrays them in a favorable light before themselves or
others. Although we sought to minimize such biases by
creating anonymous decision-making situations and not
revealing that we were studying interreligious discrimina-
tion, we are nevertheless aware of this issue: Participants
who may have inferred what the study was about may
have also downplayed their wish to discriminate between
different religious groups. If this was the case, we would
expect more discrimination—meaning stronger effects—
without such biases to manifest in all of our experimental
treatments.
There are several opportunities for crucial further
research here. Our sample includes only Christians
and Muslims in Christian-majority/Muslim-minority
countries. Christianity and Islam are both missionary
monotheistic faiths that are particularly prone to the be-
lief in one true religion—and the resulting effects on dis-
crimination and related conflict (e.g., Assmann 2009).
Whether these results hold true for other faiths such
as Buddhism and Hinduism or for traditional beliefs in
Africa and elsewhere, as well as in more conflict-prone
contexts, should be tested. In our study, the receiver’s re-
ligious affiliation was always known. Future studies could
include a condition with a receiver’s faith being unknown,
to test the difference between in- and outgroup discrim-
ination in a more precise manner. Other prominent re-
ligious ideas might also influence altruistic, discrimina-
tory, or other forms of socially relevant behavior, such
as trust and cooperation. Research is needed to disen-
tangle the effects of religion and ethnicity more carefully,
and to address the impact of social desirability bias more
thoroughly.
Although challenges and opportunities for future
research abound, our results are politically relevant and
have concrete implications in the present. We have found
convincing evidence that claims vis-à-vis one true religion
increase intergroup discrimination. Such a belief is con-
nected to other fundamentalist attitudes and, indirectly,
the readiness to use violence. Accordingly, discrimination
may have unpleasant effects well beyond the artificial
setting of an experiment, and it holds the potential to
fuel tensions between religious communities worldwide.
Our findings are connected to the debate on an built-in
tendency toward intolerance in missionary monotheistic
faiths (e.g., Assmann 2009). Yet, we have good news
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too. To promote peaceful coexistence between religious
groups, it seems promising to incentivize religious teach-
ings that are particularly tolerant and that deemphasize
the superiority of one’s own religion, stressing instead
tolerance toward other faiths and “universal love.”
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